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Error - Instructions.-In murder 
evidence of 
pur-
was familiar with means 
to have been used in commission of crime and 
that he possessed knowledge that have been useful in 
commission of sueh crime, but that could not consider 
such evidence where other offense involved was a "later of-
was not prejudicial, assault occurred a few 
seconds after defendant shot where defendant ad-
mitted on witness stand shot which killed de-
ceased and that he was familiar with manner of 
operating gun. 
[3] Criminal Law-Trial-Objection to and Striking Out Evidence. 
-Mere of to asked defendant as 
to what caused scar on his head does not eliminate his answer 
to question in absence of any strike such answer. 
[ 4] !d.-Appeal-Harmless to Evidence. 
-Defendant was not to 
question asked him as to what caused scar on where 
materiality or of such question 




"Indians" shows that they 
and that fact alone is in-
federal government Pxclusive 
committed in Indian b(~canse such juris-
dietion do('S not exist when crime involves Indians who have 
mr1 "'''"r~ as, for severing 
habits or by receiving 
patent in fee from federal 
Indians-Jurisdiction.-An Indian who has be-
is to be treated like non-Indian for purposes 
case, and state courts have juris-
an Indian where non-Indian 
anotlwr non-Indian in Indian country. 
26 Cal.App.2d 618, 622-623, 
Indians- Jurisdiction.--Doeuments entitled 
insuffieient to murder ease within 
to federal jurisdiction over 
Indians in Indian country 
def(mdant and victim of murder 
relates to race and 
whether they 
.imris•dic:ticm or were 
Criminal Law-Appeal-Reduction of Punishment Imposed.-
of ('rror, death in a 
ease eannot be reduced on 
Cal.Jur., Indians, § 3; Am.Jur., Indians, §50 et seq. 
C. J.-A 
further consideration to the question 
evidenee on in death cases. F'or reasons here-
inafter stated we have concluded that it may not be so received. 
'l'he defendant not guilty and not guilty by reason 
of to a of the murder of Wilbur McSwain. 
guilty of first murder, without 
aJHl another found him sane. 'l'he judg-
ment senteneed him io death, antl tl1e cat->c is here on auto-
matic 'rherc was no motion for a new trial. 
'!'be defendant was iried on the same charge 
and found of murder. At that trial he was also found 
under a second of assault with intent to murder 
Alvin McSwain, the brother of ·wilbur. On appeal this court 
reversed the of conviction of murder for refusal 
instruetious and because of the giving 
instructions fi murdee, but tlw 
conviction on the seeond count 1vas affirmed. 
36 CaL2d 76R [ 228 P.2d 281J.) 
'rlw evidence at the second trial was snhstantially the same 
as at the first. Briefly summarized il show;; that on the t)\'e-
22, 1 the defendant dnwe JJis (;ar to a 
dance at Yosemite Fori's in }ladera Riding with 
him were l<Jlla ·wilbur 1\leSwain, Davi::> 
and CheiJOL Alvin ::\IeSwain was also at the dance. 
After the l1anee many of those the above 
mentionrd persons, went to a place known as Kilroy's I1ast 
Stand, where soft drinks and sandwiches were sold. An 
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in which Alvin Chenot 
llU'UHJl!:) nO 
After 13 or 20 minutes he heard 
it. J n the front sE'at of the 
and Yrilbnr and in the back seat were 
Davis and Alvin JVIeS>vain. The (1efem1ant said 
to kill all of them Donnell, and he fired 
tile front 'Wilbur who was then 
the other side of the car. He then walked to1Yard the back 
the ear and fired three shots into the back 
tbree wounds on Al'dn. Immediately afterwards he was dis-
clrmed. \Yilbur died from his wound several hours later. 
The sceond trial was solely for the murder of and 
defendant urges that it was error to admit evidence of 
the shooting of Alvin, because, he the assault 
independent offense other than that for >vhich he was 
tried. The shooting of Alvin occurred a few seconds 
the defendant shot ·wilbur. Alvin and \Vilbur were 
both of the same family, and the defendant had threatened 
to kill the whole family. [1] 'l'hesc and other circumstances 
the case elcarly show that the shooting- of Alvin was a 
of the same transaction in whieh \Vilbur was 
evid(•nce pertaining to it was therefore admissible. 
Proc., 1850, 1870, subd. 7; Pen. Code, § 1102; People 
. O'Bryam, 165 Cal. 55, 59 [130 P. 1042]; Y. 
153 Cal. 10, 12 [94 P. 92); People v. il1cClnre, 148 Cal. 
P. v. 123 Cal. 298 [55 
; People Y. C1·owley, 13 CaLApp. 322, 325-326 
P. 493].) Its relevancy on the issue of the defendant intent 
shooting Wilbur is obvious. (People v. 2 CaL2d 
277 [ 40 P.2d 823] ; People v. 0 'Bryan, CaL 
People v. MilLer, 121 Cal. 343 P. 
111 Cal. 460 [44 P. 186]; People v 
[32 P. 864].) The case of People v. 
[ 34 P. 856], relied upon by the 
factors here present such as the threat 
was to kill the "whole family" and the 
of his threat by killing Wilbur and by to 
murder .Alvin as part of the same affray. (See People v. 
346 
as 
the admission of 





the defendant is innocent or crime 
him in this action. You are not to con-
sicler that for any other purpose. 'l'he value, 
if any, of such evidence on whether or not it tends 
to show: ) the identity of the person who committed the 
crime in in this ease, if it was committed; 
or tl1at the defendant had a motive for the commission 
of the offense him in this action ; or ( 3) that 
the defendant entertained the intent which is a necessary 
element of ihe alleged crime for ·which he now is on trial, 
as pointed out in other of my instructions; or that the 
defendant was familiar with the means alleged to have been 
nsed in the commission of the crime of which he is accused 
in this action; or ) that the defendant possessed knowledge 
that might have been useful in the commission of the crime 
for which he is now on trial; or that there existed in the 
mind of the defendant a plan, scheme, or into 
which fitted the commission of the offense for which he now 
is on trial.'' '!'hereafter the court stated that the could 
consider the evidence for purposes ( 4) and ( 5), but could 
not consider it in connection with those purposes where the 
other offense involved was a ''later offense.'' The defend-
ant's point seems to be that the People knew that the Alvin 
shooting was a later offense than the killing of ·wilbur and 
therefore should not have offered the instruction embracing 
( 4) and . The instruction was somewhat inconsistent, for 
it said, in the listing of purposeR, that the Alvin affair could 
be considered and, that a later offense could 
not be considered. If there was error, however, we fail to 
see how it could have prejudiced the defendant. He admitted 
on the witness stand that he fired the shot which killed ·wilbur 
and that he was thoroughly familiar with the manner of 
the gun, there was no serious 
at the trial with respect to the matters referred 




TuE CouRT: it 
'' There was no 
the 
it " and 
it did.'' X o further were asked Oil 
and tlw matter was dropped. lt does not appear 
there 11·as any en·ot· in the [4] 'l1he 
or of the question asked of the defend-
was not apparent, and eounsel for the defendant did not 
to the purpose of the or offer to 
slio1v how an ans·wer migbt be relevant. Jn the absence of 
sll<:ll a showing no prejudice appears. v. Danielly, 
Cal.2d a62, ;riG [202 P.2d 18 j ; People Y. 194 CaL 
65:! McOann, 194 CaL 692-
On thl' trial of tlle of not reason of 
et! the prose-
to open the ease and to make the opening 
argcwwut. Couusel for the defend:mt declined to argue the 
on the insanity plea. aud tlJHt isi-Hle \Yas submitted to 
i h•· after iustruetions. 'l'lw defendant claims 
1 ilat. inasnnwh as he had tl1c burden of such order 
and arg:nment constitnterl error. That question 
to be settled. [5] "No seetion of the Penal Code 
directs the order of tlle trial npoJJ a of not 
illy b~- reason of insanity, ancl it has been held 
def(•m1allt lws no right to O]:Wl1 and c:lose the argument 
the jnry ( v. Hickman (Ul2R). 204 Cal. 470, 482 
P. 270 P. 11 Y Ooold ( , 215 Cal. 
7GG fl2 P.2d 9G8]; v. Kimball (1936), 5 Cal.2d 
611 P.2d 483]; see, also, People v. Hardy (1948), 
Cal.2cl 52, 65-66 [198 P.2d 865]) although the trial court 
may permit him to do so (see People v. Lee (1930), 108 
Mr. Hobert 
appeared before 
reason to believe that 
United States may have exclu-
matter. defendant 
additional evic1ence on appeal 
is an Indian and that the land on which 
was committed was an Indian allotment. Thereafter 
filed a signed the proseeution alone, 
re Application to Produce 
It among other that defendant 
but h,; a eitizen of California who has never been 
to any restrictions on account of his race and has at 
all times all the rights and privileges of any other 
that <leeedent ·wilbur McSwain was an Indian, that 
letters to the lots where the crime was committed were 
issued the United States to Maggie Jim, an Indian, that 
the letters are still held in trust by the United States 
of America and that the lots have never been part of an 
Indian reservation. The defendant signed and filed a sep-
arate so-called "stipulation" in which he disagreed with some 
of the matters set forth in the document fileu by the People 
but stated that defendant and ·wilbm McSwain were Indians, 
that the crime took place on lands allotted by the 
[;nited States in trust for Maggie ,Jim, an Indian, and that 
tl1e lands are still held in trust. 
The briefs of the parties have presented numerous ques-
tions the of considering a stipula-
tion of fads made on appeal, the meaning of the particular 
documents filed by the parties, the construction and effect 
of the federal statutes, and the constitutionality of 
such statutes if they are interpreted to vest exclusive juris-
diction over the crime in the federal government. \Ve have 
concluded that the proposed offer to produce additional evi-
dence on the appeal should be denied. Furthermore, even 
that additional evidence could be received on 
in this class of cases by stipulation or otherwise, 
the facts stated in the so-called "stipulation" as well as 
shown in the entire record are insufficient to show exclusive 
jurisdiction in the federal courts. 
PEOPLE v. CARMEN 
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a .i nry !rial 1vas 
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Cal.2cl iJ:37, 546 219 P .2d 1 j ; see also 
152-154 P.2d 
at the trial is not sufficient 
a determination that there is exelusive federal 
in the and we do not pass on the 
of what remedies may be available to the defendant 
sho1v alleged lack of jurisdiction in the state court. 
tlJe record indicates that the location of the 
'Indian " ·within the 
havr been cited. 
and While there was 
and the victim were " " the use of this 
more, shows that the persons 
and blood. That fact is insufficient to vest in the federal 
government exclusive jurisdiction over a crime committed in 
, because such does not exist when 
crime inyolves Indians who have been 
manner, as, for 
350 PEOPLE v. CARMEN [43 0.2d 
v. 
S.Ot. 107, 41 
104 u.s. 624 
327 U.S. 
622-623 [80 P.2d 
unnecessary to the decision, to the 
of the cases with emanci-
where the defendant has com-
mitted murder or one of the other crimes designated 
in what is now section 1153 of title 18 of the United States 
Code. The Ketchum, Monroe, Howard and Irvine 
cases, eited in the preceding paragraph, involved those major 
crimes, and the only decision eited in the Pratt ease does not 
support its statement. The language in the Pratt case must 
therefore be insofar as it is inconsistent with 
the views ,v,·n·~''""wl 
[11] ·The two documents entitled "stipulation," even if 
the effect of a stipulation to the extent that they agree 
on some of the facts, are likewise insufficient to bring this 
ease within the cited statutes to federal 
diction over offenses committed or against Indians in 
Indian country. Insofar as the status of the defendant and 
the stipulation adds 
nothing to the evidence at trial because in effect, 
relates to the race and descent of these persons and 
does not disclose whether were Indians of the type 
subject to federal jurisdiction or whether they were emanci-
[8b] the stipulation indicates that the crime 
was committed on allotment lands held in trust for an Indian 
and thus may have taken place in "Indian " (18 
U.S.O. § 1151 , this alone, as we have seen, does not establish 
exclusive federal jurisdiction. since the stipu-
aud ,J. pro 
J.---I coneur in the 
agree that the evidence in the record facie suffi-
to proye that the state courts of California possess 
have exerc~ised jnrisdiction over both t1Je defendant and 
f~rime of which he has been and I further agree 
! lmt there is no stipulation before the court establishing facts 
"11ffieient to show that the state courts of California lack ;juris-
' lidion eithrr in to the defendant or the crime. 
CAiiTEH. ,f.----I dtssent. 
l agree IYith tbe that "'where trial jury IS 
mattrr of '' and a ease has been tried by a jury, an 
•pcllate (~OlUt camwt recein; additional eYidrcnce 011 appeaL 
It <loes not necessarily follow. lwwen:r, that an appellate eourt 
,•;J.nnot consider stipulations and admissions of jurisdictional 
\d1ieh arc not of tlle reeord. Wl1ere the parties 
in a stipulation of faet:s on appeal the court is not tllereby 
reqnirerl to cleH>rmine fadnal mattC'r:-: bnt n:maim; strictly 
wit!Jin its t·onstii utionaJ of "cp1estions 
qf Jaw alone." Althoug·h a number of eases, both in Cali-
fomia ;md other jnrisdietion,, have considered the question 
<!!'stipulations and admissions of fad on appeal, 110 ease has 
liet•n found that nde11L!aiely (liscnsses this 
The ('!os('st California ease is People \'. 176 Cal. 
():). 107 11fi7 P. 6D6]. which im·o!Yed an appeal from a coll-
\'lc,tion of murder where the death was imposed. 
~-Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council. 
C.2d 
in the interests of 
After section 4 of 
p. 107 
in such 
for the purpose of the deter-
to whether there has been any error 
of the trial court. \Y e have no 
and may determine no 
find no substantial enor of law, we 
of the ](rwer eourt. It is dear, too, 
eonsilleration of sueh an appeal for this limited 
confined to the record sent to us from the 
ignores the prineiple, noted 
in a stipulation of facts 
.,.,.~nn•c•rl to determine fac-
matters but remains strictly within its constitutional 
of "questions of law alone." Moreover, 
in the wording of article VI, section 4, which 
an appellate court to be ''confined to 
the rrcon1" in the sense that it cannot look at stipulations 
and admissions of faets outside the record of the trial court. 
other California case that appears to be in point 
is v. 121 345, 347-348 [8 P.2d 920]. 
There the court held that "the statements of counsel and the 
in their briefs for the 
purpose of the omissions in the record'' could not 
be considered to establish who requested a particular instruc-
tion which defendant attacked on appeal. The appellate 
"'"U"'-'''"va of District Courts of Appeal in criminal cases, 
like that o£ this is limited to determination of '' ques-
tions of alone'' ( Const., art. § 4b), and the opinion, 
as case, does not discuss the possibility that 
use of sueh statements and admissions is proper under 
court constitutional powers. the authorities 
eited the court in the Mesa case do not support its con-
the cases are in conflict as to whether 
or admissions on appeal as to matters not in 
the record can be considered. Some cases hold that they 
will be considered. (State v. Goodager, 56 Ore. 198 [108 P. 
evidence to show 
California and asserts 
that a crime was committed ·within a certain 
it failed to that the 
subject 
People v. 
P.2d 84] .) 





m waived any objection 
trial on such facts. 
a vvhere the essential facts can be 
settled by stipulation of the parties, and where all questions 








go the motions 
such as habeas corpus. 
Constitution which pre-
the of the parties, and 
and should do so in the present 
now argues 
tua.c>vu of facts.'' 
and the 
two documents arc different in substance and language with 
""'oYH>nr to items. of course, are contracts 
upon the terms of which the must come to an agree-
ment. Sec 23 CaLJur. 822.) Attached to the document 
offered the is a copy of a letter to de-
fendant's counsel stating that "this is as far as we can go 
in any of facts'' and that if defendant had any 
objection to ''any of the facts appearing in the stipulation 
or if you in the stipulation we would appreciate it if 
you would advise the court in the premises.'' This letter 
seerns to have left it open for defendant to accept or reject 
the People's in whole or in part. The defendant's 
stipulation was in response to that of the People and agreed 
with some items but expressly rejected others. Accordingly, 
I will proceed upon the theory that the parties have made a 
stipulation with respect to all matters as to which the two 
documents are substantially in accord. 
It is stated in each document that defendant is an Indian, 
but this must be to refer only to his race and 
blood because the People qualified their stipulation with the 
statement that defendant has never been subject to any re-
strictions on account of his race and has at all times enjoyed 
all rights and privileges of any other citizen of California. 
Both documents state that ·wilbur Dan McSwain, the victim, 
"was an " but, unlike the statement relating to de-
fendant, no qualification is made by the People with respect 
to the status of McSwain. For this reason we should probably 
treat McSwain as an ''Indian'' not only as far as race and 
descent are concerned but also for the purposes of the federal 
statutes which use the word "Indian." Some indication of 
the intent of the parties in using the word ''Indian'' may be 
derived from the fact that the documents submitted by both 
parties were entitled "stipulation [regarding] application to 
produce evidence,'' since the ''application'' which is thus re-





of the Sierra 
and courts exelusive control and that the 
federal power over Indians is outmoded. 
ihis connection, that exclusive federal 1s mcon-
sistent with federal 
that all Indians born 
~which pro-
States are citizens. 
contended ihat the state On behalf of 
over him in that exclusive 
in such cases i:s \'Csted in the United States and 
courts by reason of sections 1133 and 3242 of 
United States Code 1949. 
title 
Section 1151 as otherwise pro-
dr1ed in sections 1154 title sections 
to Indians and the definition 
omrnt•·"' as relates to the laws]' 
. ' as used in this means (a) 
limits of reservation under 
notwith-
356 PEOPLE v. CARMEN 





robbery, and on and within 
shall be tried in the same and 
357 
citizen of the 
for that reason, our 
That contention was answered ad-
United .States 241 U.S. 591 
598): 
'l'he status of Indians as citizens seems immaterial in de-
~,'"~""'"'"' whether the federal has exclusive juris-
diction over offenses in Indian In 1924 Congress 
that all Indians born in the United States are citizens 
the United States. U.S.C.A.. § 8 U.S.C.A.. 
3.) all such Indians are citizens of the state 
which A.mdt. It has been 
m cases that the 
Indians does not mean that 
federal 
born in this was not intended to amount to an in-
direct wholesale abandonment of federal particularly 
in view of the many federal statutes upon Indians which 
were left unchanged, and it would be more reasonable to ex-
PEOPLE CARMEN [43 C.2d 
would 
S.Ct. 
, was an Omaha Indian 
Nebraska. citizen of the United States 
and of the in He contended at the 
trial that the state The Supreme 
Court held that the and said: 
'' he States had not with the title 
to the but still held them in trust for the Indians. In 
that situation power make rules and regulations re-
"IJ'C'-'"-'""' such was ample.'' 
It is contended the People that this state had jurisdiction 
in that it had never ceded jurisdiction over the land on which 
the crime occurred. In United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 
535 S.Ct. 82 L.Ed. 410], it was held that the principle 
of exclusive federal over crimes involving Indians 
on Indian reservations is not based on a cession of such 
jurisdiction by the states to the federal government but is 
based on the constitutional authority of the United States to 
deal with the Indians. It is argued by the People that whether 
the defendant was a ward of the United States (as held in 
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 [6 S.Ct. 1109, 30 
L.Ed. 228]) was a question of fact which should have been 
raised at one of defendant's two trials, and that the burden 
was on defendant to prove such wardship, or jurisdiction, as 
a defense. In United States v. Rogers, 23 F. 658, it was held 
that the matter of in a criminal proceeding is 
never presumed; that it must always be proved and is never 
waived as a defense. It was further held there that the ques-
tion of jurisdiction can be raised at any stage of the pro-
ceeding. (See also United States v. Anderson, 60 F.Supp. 
649, 650, that if the court is without jurisdiction of 
the subject matter, its proceeding is a nullity.) "Even the 
consent of the accused cannot confer jurisdiction, and it is 
an issue that can be made at any stage of the proceedings, 
... " In Costa v. Banta civil case), 98 Cal.A.pp.2d 181, 
182 [219 P.2d , it was held that "Although the juris-
diction of that court was not questioned during the trial, it 
is well established that questions of jurisdiction are never 
waived and may be raised for the first time on appeal.'' In 
State v. Pepion (1951), 125 Mont. 13 [230 P.2d 961], the de-
fendant, an Indian, committed larceny within the limits of 
an Indian reservation. The court held that he was subject 
1954] PEOPLE 'IJ. CARMEN 
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federal laws and was under the exclusive 
diction of the United States courts. It was there held that 
the state district court was without and that its 
was a 
contend that section 1153 extended the definition 
Indian for the first 
time in 1948 that in order to exclusive 
the United States such Indian allottees must 
Indian title" to the land. By 
it is is meant that the Indians under 
such an allotment must have had an ' use and 
occupancy or to land which a statutorily 
Indian reservation." The crime occurred in 1950, 
and a complete answer to this is that the sections 
under consideration do not so provide. Nothing is to be 
found therein providing that Indian allotments must have 
once been part of an Indian reservation. The contend 
that the sections were amended to cover Indian allotments 
after the decision in United States v. Pelican, 232 U.S. 442, 
449 [34 S.Ct. 396, 58 L.Ed. 676], wherein it was held that 
land once part of an Indian reservation did not lose its char-
acter as Indian country by reason of a subsequent allotment 
to Indians. It was there held: "But, meanwhile, the lands 
remained Indian lanlis set for Indians under govern-
mental care; and we are unable to find ground for the con-
elusion that they become other than Indian through 
the distribution into separate the Government re-
taining control." It would appear that the Pelican decision 
adds nothing to the People's argument and serves merely to 
establish that the statute was amended so as to cover, specifi-
cally, Indian allotments. v. United 186 F.2d 
93, relied upon by the People is not in point here. That case 
involved the murder of an Indian by an Indian in 1942. 
At that time section 1151 did not include Indian allotments 
The court there 
said: ''But, judging federal 
of the statute when the offense was we are now 
constrained to hold that when the reservation was dissolved 
and tribal government broken up, the allotted lands lost their 
character as lands 'within any Indian reservation'." The 
court there noted that it was not alleged that either Indian 
involved the status of an allottee of lands the title 
to which wa:s held in trust the United States and that 
360 PEOPLE v. CARMEN [43 C.2d 
had not seen fit to so 






ll'icuet1vu with the United States. Since the 
that the United States has ex-
a the contention 1s 
and therefore 
the trial court to dismiss the 
